Sunday, 8 June 2025

The New Right’s Climate Scepticism Lacks a Coherent Ideology

According to David McWilliams, "The Right Wing vs Net Zero is a big big political debtate ... gaining more currency in more countries [including] the US, UK, Spain, everywhere. Basically [the claim is that] Net-Zero is a 'woke target' that has been created to cripple the working man through high energy prices."


Prominent New Right movements – from MAGA supporters in the US to Europe’s Reform UK, France’s National Rally and Germany’s AfD – often portray climate change policy as a plot by shadowy “elites” to foist hardships on ordinary people. Nigel Farage, for example, has dismissed anthropogenic climate change as a “scam”, even while admitting he hasn’t “got a clue” about the science. Reform UK’s manifesto baldly claims “Net zero…can’t [stop climate change]. Climate change has happened for millions of years… We are better to adapt to warming, rather than pretend we can stop it.” Such rhetoric frames decarbonisation as a technocratic folly at best, or a deliberate elite conspiracy at worst – an expensive crusade that punishes working folk for negligible benefit. This conspiratorial bent echoes across the New Right. In the US, some Republican figures increasingly echo theories that global warming is a “hoax” by world leaders to control and impoverish populations. Prof Robert Lawrence claims that climate policies are an ideal target for populists because they “rely on expert knowledge, entail globalist thinking” and offer “ample fodder for conspiracy theories” given their preventive (and thus less visible) benefits. 


To be sure, there are real distributional issues in climate policy. Poorly designed green taxes or regulations can hit lower-income and rural communities hard. France’s gilets jaunes protests in 2018 – “explosive anger at fuel prices and inequality… fired up by a carbon tax on petrol” after other tax cuts for the wealthy – vividly demonstrated how not to implement climate policy. Across Europe, observers note a “21st-century alliance” of right-wing populists with groups like disgruntled farmers against environmental measures (from fertiliser rules to emissions targets). This has fuelled backlashes to policies perceived as ignoring the little guy. Such grievances cannot be dismissed outright: climate action does bring social costs that must be shared fairly. However, abandoning climate action altogether is not justifiable. The evidence of climate risk is robust, and the long-term costs of inaction dwarf the upfront costs of mitigation. Nicholas Stern responded to the recent interventional by Tony Blair, warning that delaying cuts to carbon emissions will only exacerbate “climate change impacts that are already hurting households and businesses across the world… Delay is dangerous”. Indeed, the science is unequivocal that only reaching net zero greenhouse emissions will halt further warming – and the public, by and large, does not “want climate extremes of flooding, wildfires and crop failures” to worsen. In Britain, for example, about 61% of people support the net-zero-by-2050 goal (including a majority of 2019 Conservative voters), whereas barely a quarter oppose it. These realities undercut the New Right’s narrative that “ordinary people” reject climate action en masse. Yes, climate policy can impose near-term costs, but the answer is to design just transitions – not to indulge conspiracy theories or ignore a mounting crisis for the sake of short-term populism.



Anti-intellectualism and “Common Sense” Climate Denial


The New Right’s hostility to climate policy hinges on a broader anti-intellectual streak and deep suspicion of experts. Climate change mitigation, by its nature, involves scientific data, complex modelling and global coordination – everything populists love to sneer at. Populist leaders often dismiss scientific consensus as alarmism or even fabrication (despite the data and modelling being freely accessible to anyone with the time, inclination, and nous to look at it). They recast their anti-science stance as “common sense”. For instance, Germany’s AfD derides EU climate plans as “eco-socialist redistribution” and extols fossil fuels as the “basis of our prosperity”. In the Netherlands, the Party for Freedom rails against “hysterical reduction of CO2” and “wasting billions on pointless climate hobbies”. The clear message is that “real people” need not trust elite scientists or international agreements; instead, they should trust gut instinct that the climate fuss is overblown. This anti-intellectual posture also means evidence and expert warnings are easily waved away as part of the supposed conspiracy. Every heatwave, flood or wildfire can be rhetorically hand-waved – either denied outright, or attributed to sinister forces (as seen in wild online theories blaming deliberate weather manipulation by global elites). By nurturing a narrative that climate science is just another elitist orthodoxy – like “woke” culture or other bugbears – the New Right enables its followers to ignore inconvenient facts. The movement’s distrust of “experts” and multilateral institutions (e.g. the UN climate panel, or the Paris Agreement) provides a ready-made filter to interpret climate action as something nefarious or foolish. In short, climate change gets folded into the populist culture war, where loyalty to the cause often means proudly dismissing expert opinion as propaganda.



A Slogan in Search of an Ideology


Notably, this anti-climate stance often seems less a coherent ideology than a politically expedient slogan. It is a rallying cry that taps into anger about energy prices, taxes or remote bureaucrats, rather than a well-argued alternative philosophy on environmental stewardship. Unlike traditional political ideologies that offer systematic principles, the New Right’s climate scepticism is riddled with contradictions. It champions fossil fuels under the banner of nationalism and prosperity, yet ignoring that continued reliance on oil and gas can leave nations vulnerable (as Europe’s gas crisis showed) and dependent on volatile global markets. It claims to stand for the “little guy” while downplaying or denying climate threats that, in reality, hit the vulnerable hardest (through extreme weather, crop failures, etc.). And as a policy agenda, “scrapping net zero” or slashing green regulations amounts to a negation, not a vision.


Could one argue that an ideology underpins this stance? Perhaps. My preferred theory is that there is simply electoral advantage in promising low information and low education voters reduced short term costs, knowing full well that the long term costs that will hit them further down the line will be someone else's political problem. But perhaps I'm being uncharitable? One coherent political philosophy that could fit the New Right's positioning here is related to their stance on global economic integration: they're agin it. Perhaps this principle overrides all, even the cost benefit analysis that shows climate action to be a no brainer? They prioritise national sovereignty, and define possible climate action purely in national terms (and as a global externality, the cost benefit analysis does indeed change if you think only of the economic benefits to you, and the climate harms to you, of your own carbon emissions, ignoring reciprocal actions across the world). This would lead to a preference for adaptation measures over mitigation, and would allow climate mitigation to be framed as an extension of unpopular "globalism". 


However, whether this amounts to a coherent ideology is questionable. It often looks more like a reactive collage of talking points – anti-tax, anti-regulation, anti-expert – rather than a principled worldview. And in practice, simply ignoring climate change is not a tenable governing strategy – as droughts, floods or energy disruptions mount, any government is forced to respond. So the New Right’s climate posture looks like more performative populism than a serious long-term program. It is a stance that rallies opposition but offers no realistic alternative.


Ironically, threads of traditional right-wing ideology could support robust climate action if reinterpreted. Conservatives typically prize Order, stability and security – all of which are threatened by unchecked climate change. Military and security experts (many with conservative credentials) have long warned that global warming poses “a significant risk to…national security”, acting as a “threat multiplier” by stoking conflicts, mass migration and disasters. A true law-and-order mindset might view rising seas or megadroughts as akin to invasions or crime waves: existential threats to the nation’s welfare requiring a strong response. Likewise, the right’s patriotic duty to safeguard the homeland could encompass protecting communities from climate havoc and investing in resilience. Even the ideal of preserving social order for future generations aligns with curbing runaway climate disruption. In this sense, one could imagine a right-wing environmentalism that treats climate stability as a conservative cause – conserving the nation’s landscapes, livelihoods and continuity against a destructive force.


On the other hand, the libertarian strain of right-wing thought – emphasising individual freedom and market solutions – can clash with prescriptive government climate interventions. Populists often invoke personal liberty to oppose measures like bans on petrol and diesel cars, painting them as green authoritarianism. Yet even here, there is room for synergy. Free-market libertarians do typically value the ability to protect private property. All carbon pricing does is charge the external damage (that is, to others' private property) as an additional cost for fossil fuels. In fact, proposals to price or tax carbon have deep conservative roots: free-market icons from William F. Buckley Jr. to Milton Friedman championed pollution taxes as the economically efficient way to address externalities. Harnessing market forces to reduce emissions – via carbon tax-and-dividend system – arguably fits squarely within a right-wing preference for minimal government micromanagement, using incentives rather than mandates. Moreover, innovation-led approaches (promoting nuclear energy, carbon capture, etc.) can appeal to pro-business, tech-positive conservatives. Thus, while the anti-collectivism of some traditional right-wing values may conflict with specific climate policies, they do not inherently reject all climate action. The divide is more about means than ends: whether to allow government intervention versus trusting the market and individuals. It is noteworthy that several centre-right governments and leaders (such as Thatcher and Merkel) have acknowledged climate change and pursued solutions in line with their ideological bent. This underscores that rejecting climate science is not a prerequisite of conservative ideology, but rather a feature of this current populist moment.



Populist Climate Rhetoric vs. Reality


In the end, the New Right’s fiery rhetoric on climate change represents a stark departure from both the prudential “order-keeping” and the pro-market strands of conservative tradition. The populist framing – climate policy as elitist overreach – might resonate in the short term, especially during cost-of-living crises, but its sustainability is very much in doubt. It relies on the simultaneous discontent and lack of engagement of low information and low education voters. As evidence of climate disruption mounts year by year (with record heat, fires and floods becoming hard to ignore), outright denialism and obstruction may steadily lose public patience. Already, large majorities across many countries accept the reality of climate change and want action. While populist leaders can rally support by tapping into grievances, they have not demonstrated a credible path forward on climate itself – a fact that may become apparent to voters when impacts hit home. If and when the New Right’s champions find themselves in positions of power, they may be forced into an awkward reckoning with physics and economics. Climate change will not conform to political messaging. As one climate commentator put it, “Net zero…[means] stopping temperatures spiralling out of control…bringing drastically increased risk of…civilisation-level disaster. There is no happy medium… There is only action that is fast enough or not, and political decisions that distribute the cost fairly or not.” In other words, railing against “green elites” will not stop the floods or wildfires.

The rise of Reform

This feels like an almost revolutionary moment. With MAGA in power, and with Reform, AfD, Rassemblement National, etc on the rise across the "western" world, something is clearly happening.


What is the common ideology? What is this in response to? Does it make any sense and how can we understand it all? The next several blogs are my attempts to answer these questions. But to introduce them, I'll say that I think there are four policy pillars of this "movement". These are:

1) Anti NetZero

2) Anti DEI

3) Low tax

4) Nationalism


I think the first is easiest to think about and dismiss: it makes no sense! There is no ideology here, just wilful stupidity. I'll have a look at this in more detail in the next blog, and follow up blogs will cover each of these four items, followed by another looking at why this feels like an almost revolutionary moment. First of all though, it's helpful to define what I mean by ideology here. It's nothing to do with agreed upon facts! Rather ideology is about values: equity vs opportunity; importance of tradition vs openness to change; communitarianism vs individualism; valorising the perspective of workers/producers, or consumers/service users; etc. We can agree on facts but propose different policy based on ideological differences. And none of these ideological differences play a role in this Anti NetZero position.


The revolutions of the 17th, 18th, & 19th centuries were against the absolutism of the divine right of kings, and for rights of the individual, equality before the law, and protections from the predations of the state. The further revolutions of 19th & 20th centuries were against the unequal distribution of wealth and power, and for a communal system of economics and governance. This coming revolution is against something (it is absolutely the case that society is not working well, and we still have those unequal distributions of wealth and power) but it doesn't seem to be for anything other than "common sense", which as I'll show over the next few blogs, seems to almost equate to wilful stupidity. 


Previous revolutions started from high principle, had some success, and then failed when they got stupid. For example, the great liberal French Revolution went off the rails when it started to give in to the demands of the Sans Culotte for price controls on essentials that meant the producers and distributors of these essentials had no incentive to produce or distribute - all the Revolution could do instead of successfully satisfying these demands, was execute anyone who raised their head against them in the Terror. And the great social Russian Revolution took a dark turn when any disagreement with Lenin, in particular that of the SRs, was deemed to be a factional split from the leadership that was to be purged. This current "revolution" however has little principle, and starts from stupid... 


One optimistic point about this though is that this stupidity becomes obvious quickly. So Trump's popularity is fast declining as he oscillates his tariff madness. Perhaps the best thing ever to happen to Reform is to get elected to local government in various parts of England in May 25, maybe they will quickly become hated when it becomes obvious they have no idea how to help people justifiably scunnered with the status quo?

Tuesday, 6 May 2025

I hate lawyers

Of course, that's not true, but there is a legal style of thought - often framing policy issues requiring the use of scarce resources (and hence unavoidable trade-offs in terms of the uses of those resources) as “rights” that trump any consideration of trade-offs - that I really object to. This objection has been highlighted recently in the area of climate policy. Climate change is, I believe, the number one policy issue facing human society over the next 50 years, so you might have thought that I would welcome any means by which to get action on this issue...

Legal action against fossil fuel companies, such as the RWE case in Germany, represent a shift toward courts becoming arbiters of climate policy. On the surface, the case for litigation against carbon majors, as clearly articulated in recent research by Callahan and Mankin, seems compelling. They argue that companies like Chevron have caused trillions in economic losses due to their emissions, and that attribution science can directly link specific emitters to particular damages.

And the science is fine - we can (in a probabilistic sense anyway) attribute damages to a given quantity of emissions. However, I would argue that fining specific companies for their share of given damages that can be attributed to climate change is highly problematic.

Let’s entirely accept the premise that fossil fuels caused damages with accurately calculated valuations. Should a given fossil fuel supplier be charged this amount, years after the fuels they supplied were burnt? These damages were the product of commercial activities, involving both suppliers and consumers, that were perfectly legal at the time. Why, then, are only the suppliers being held accountable? Should consumers bear responsibility too? And even if we decide to target only suppliers for liability, most profits made from fossil fuel sales have already been distributed to shareholders, possibly decades ago. The current shareholders, some of whom might be activist shareholders using their positions to advocate for more responsible climate policies, are hardly the responsible parties.

Some argue that these companies bear responsibility because they knowingly concealed information about the damages of climate change. But a company itself cannot "hide" information: individual people within that company did. If those actions were illegal, the responsible individuals should face prosecution. If they weren’t illegal at the time, perhaps laws should be revised rather than retrospectively holding entire corporations responsible for actions driven by a few individuals.

Furthermore, the use of courts to essentially dictate climate policy raises crucial issues of democratic legitimacy. Climate change, with its far-reaching impacts and trade-offs, demands collective societal decisions. These decisions should ideally come through our political processes, where priorities like poverty alleviation, healthcare, education, and, climate action, can be openly debated and democratically weighed.

Legal shortcuts risk circumventing these necessary debates. Courts operate within a framework defined by legal precedent and statutory interpretation, not democratic consensus. When a judge determines that "the law" mandates a society's resources be committed to climate mitigation or compensation, it bypasses a vital step: collective agreement and prioritisation.

Take poverty alleviation as a competing priority. Arguably, the resources needed to tackle climate change might be seen as more urgently required elsewhere, at least temporarily. Advocates for judicial intervention tend to gloss over these difficult trade-offs, saying that those damaged by climate change have a right to these resources such that potential trade-offs do not need to be considered. However, rights are easily created, and without considering the overall budget constraint at the aggregate level, we can easily legally engineer a situation in which each of 11 people are all entitled to 10% of society’s resources. But just because we can legally do it, doesn’t mean we can mathematically do it.

The imperatives of “rights” is a kind of moral absolutism, and this rarely persuades. Instead, it risks fuelling backlash among those who feel their voices aren't heard, potentially undermining broad societal support necessary for sustained climate action. Courts typically aren't accountable to the public in the same way elected representatives are. Judges don't stand for re-election on the strength of their climate policies; they aren’t directly answerable to voters angry about rising taxes or restricted services due to diverted resources. Entrusting climate decisions to the judiciary thus places them beyond the reach of democratic debate and correction.

Burdening systems with statutory responsibilities i.e. giving the service users of a system legal rights, is fine in the context of an ever-growing resources environment. But in the context of limited resources, and even declining resource availability, rights and responsibilities can engender system fragility and collapse. In the context of climate change, when we will see real resource constraints, we need robust and capable systems of government and decision making, with high levels of state capacity. Loading legal rights and statutory responsibilities onto such systems is entirely the wrong course of action.

So, while Callahan and Mankin make an airtight scientific case for attributing specific climate harms to specific quantities of emissions that can be mapped to the Scope 3 emissions of specific corporate entities, the leap from science to policy via litigation and rights-based frameworks is troubling. It represents a shortcut that seems attractive precisely because of political gridlock and inertia. Yet shortcuts in politics often lead to dead ends.

Climate policy achieved via courtroom victories rather than through collective societal consensus-building might gain short-term wins but could lose long-term legitimacy and support. And with the election of Paris Accord exiting Trump in the US, the rise of the Net Zero denying Reform in the UK, and its equivalents in France, Germany etc, the loss of democratic legitimacy for climate action seems frighteningly close at this juncture.


Sunday, 13 April 2025

That tariff formula

I really want to get back to blogging. And what a time to do so, as the world collapses around us! So I'll start with a take on the (now partially suspended) Trump tariffs and in particular, that formula...


The formula through which Trump set his "reciprocal" tariffs has been roundly ridiculed, and as a determination for a tariff rate that other countries are charging the USA, it rightly deserves to be. But the administration's technical justification does not claim that it is the tariff that other countries are charging the US. Rather, it mislabels "reciprocal tariffs" as the tariff required to be levied by the USA on its trading partners in order to achieve bilateral trade balance. Does it make sense on this basis?

Kind of... They claim the trade elasticity $\epsilon=-4$ [reasonable], and the pass-through rate $\phi=0.25$ [seems very low to me] (conveniently cancelling each other out, but let's take them at their word). So let's consider the case where $x_i=75$ and $m_i=100$ so that $\Delta \tau_i=25\%$ and consider what this formula would predict happens:

Firstly, the formula assumes that there is no exchange rate adjustment, which is a fairly heroic assumption. And the formula also assumes no impact on exports, which is again questionable (though perhaps follows from no exchange rate adjustment in the absence of retaliation).

Secondly, the low pass-through rate implies that prices rise by 6.25% (25% tariff times 0.25 pass-through), meaning foreign producers accept a price cut of 18.75% (since the consumer price has to cover payment to the foreign producers and the tariff payment).

And thirdly, the 6.25% price rise combined with the trade elasticity of -4 means that imports fall by 25.

So what is the outcome of this? Well there is bilateral trade balance with exports and imports now both 75. But in income flow terms between the countries this is an overreaction, as the foreign producers are only paid 56.25 of this with the 25% tariff raising 18.75 for the US government. And US consumers won't be too happy: a 6.25% price increase, combined with a 25% drop in the nominal value, means they are enjoying 29.4% fewer imported goods.

Overall then, this formula may be an answer to the question: "what tariff should we charge to eliminate the trade deficit?"; but it relies on some heroic assumptions, and even taking it at face value its imposition implies some unpleasant outcomes.